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Abstract  In his new book Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues that there is no way round 
the result that all metaethical views other than the error theory fail either for the same reasons 
as metaphysical normative realism or expressivism. In this contribution, I show that this is false: 
We can avoid this result by ‘relaxing’ about normative truths. Even if Streumer were right about 
the fate of other metaethical positions, then, relaxed realism remains immune to the problems 
he raises. 
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1 Introduction 
Discussions between normative error theorists and non-error theorists often risk hitting 
a brick wall built of metaphysical intuition: Either you happen to agree with the former 
that irreducibly normative properties would simply be metaphysically too queer to exist, 
or you concur with the latter that there is nothing odd about such properties. What I 
very much like about Bart Streumer’s new book Unbelievable Errors1 is that it seeks to 
navigate its course around this brick wall by developing a systematic inconsistency ar-
gument to the effect that normative properties would have to be both identical and 
non-identical with non-normative properties, and thus cannot exist. What I dislike 
about it, in turn, is its conclusion: I do not want to be an error theorist.   
In what follows, I will, therefore, seek to defuse Streumer’s inconsistency argument 
by ‘relaxing’ about normative truths, i.e. by defending a non-metaphysical form of nor-
mative realism—‘relaxed realism’, for short—against Streumer’s objections.2 This will 
show that although Streumer’s book provides important new arguments which undis-
putedly enrich metaethical debate and crucially force us to clarify metaethical views ever 
more thoroughly, it is not they, but other arguments which finally prove decisive for the 
tenability of metaethical positions such as relaxed realism. 
                                                             
1 All references refer to this book unless otherwise specified. 
2 For non-metaphysical realism, see Nagel (1986), Parfit (2011), Scanlon (2014, 2017), Kra-
mer (2009) and Dworkin (1996, 2011). The version of relaxed realism that I defend here might 
not be one with which every relaxed realist agrees. Since I am not interested in text exegesis, 
but in what I regard as the most plausible version of the relaxed position, that is fine by me. 
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2 Why Streumer Does Not Want to Relax 
What is relaxed realism? Borrowing from Thomas Nagel, here is one response that 
Streumer considers (p.100): 
(1)  There are normative truths, but there are no normative properties in the sense 
of ways objects can be.  
Let us assume that whenever Streumer talks of properties ‘in the sense of ways objects 
can be’, he is alluding to some robust sense of property, whereas some minimalist con-
cept is in play whenever he is talking about properties as the shadows of concepts. If 
so, relaxed realism undoubtedly amounts to the position that there are both normative 
truths and minimalist normative properties. Does it also amount to the view that there 
are no robust normative properties, as (1) states? Yes, but only if we understand this 
statement correctly—I return to this issue and its intricacies below.  
Since (1) is a little too meagre to let us assess Streumer’s case against relaxed real-
ism properly, let me quickly fill in a few more details about how I will understand this 
position. Here is the bundle of theses which, I believe, form its core: 
(A) Realism: There are normative truths and facts. 
(B) Normative non-reductionism: Normative truths are not reducible to non-
normative truths. 
(C) Minimalism: There is no substantive difference between asserting a proposi-
tion and calling this proposition true. Facts are true propositions. Properties 
are shadows of concepts. Some K exists iff the application conditions of ‘K’ 
are fulfilled. A claim purportedly represents the world iff it is a truth-apt as-
sertion.  
(D) Discourse-internality: Which application conditions ‘K’ possesses is to be de-
termined from within K-specific discourse. Given the interdefinability of 
TRUTH, FACT, PROPERTY and EXISTENCE, this means that all questions per-
taining to truth, facts, properties and existence are (at least partially) dis-
course-internal. 
The first two components make relaxed realism a form of non-reductive realism; the last 
two explain in which way this form of realism is non-metaphysical or relaxed.  
What, then, is allegedly wrong with relaxed realism? After introducing the position 
along the lines of (1), Streumer quickly goes on to state that:  
[relaxed realists] cannot avoid [his] objections by endorsing (1). If normative judge-
ments represent the world, they ascribe normative properties in the sense of a way 
objects can be. Since (1) denies that there are normative properties in this sense but 
does say that there are normative truths, (1) can only be true if normative judge-
ments do not represent the world. If [relaxed realists] endorse (1), their view there-
fore faces the symmetry objection just as much as noncognitivism does. Of course, 
they could try to avoid this objection by endorsing minimalism about representation. 
But as we saw in §34, they then run into [his] arguments against realism instead. … 
(pp.100, 101) 
Let us call this first challenge the ‘collapse dilemma’. Since we have already clarified that 
relaxed realists are indeed minimalists about representation, I will brush aside its first 
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horn3 here and zoom in exclusively on the second. That is: If relaxed realism is taken to 
fail for the same reasons as metaphysical realism, what are these reasons? 
Streumer’s case against metaphysical normative realism takes once more the form 
of a dilemma and is based on two central arguments. The first, which Streumer calls the 
“Reduction Argument” (p.9), can be reconstructed as follows:   
The Reduction Argument 
(P1) As a metaphysical realist you believe that properties are ways an object can 
be. 
(P2) If you believe that properties are ways an object can be, you are committed to 
accepting (N) as the correct criterion of property identity: 
(N)  Two predicates ascribe the same property if and only if they are nec-
essarily coextensive. 
(P3) Normative and descriptive properties are necessarily coextensive. 
(C1)  Hence, normative and descriptive properties are identical. 
The Reduction Argument thus teaches us that if we want to be metaphysical realists, we 
must be reductivists. This, though, drives us straight into the arms of Streumer’s second 
argument, which we can name the ‘Anti-Reduction Argument’: 
The Anti-Reduction Argument 
(P4) As a reductive realist, you believe that normative and descriptive properties 
are identical. 
(P5) If normative and descriptive properties are identical, the normative predicate 
F and descriptive predicate G must refer to the same descriptive property D. 
(P6) If F refers to D, there must be an explanation of how F picks out D which is 
compatible with reductionism. 
(P7) There is no explanation of how F picks out D which is compatible with re-
ductionism. (® false guarantee & regress objections) 
(C2) F does not refer to D. 
(C3)  Hence, normative and descriptive properties are not identical. 
 
The details of (P7) need not concern us until later. The important insight to take away 
for now is, rather, that according to the Anti-Reduction Argument, if we want to be 
metaphysical realists, we must be non-reductivists.  
Combining the Reduction and the Anti-Reduction Arguments thus leads to the so-
bering result that there is no convincing form of metaphysical normative realism availa-
ble: Since normative properties would have to be both identical and non-identical to 
descriptive properties, the very idea of a normative property is inconsistent. Given as 
much, let us call this argument the ‘inconsistency dilemma’ (see Fig. 1). 
                                                             
3 I praised Streumer for developing a clear inconsistency argument against normative real-
ism which avoids appeal to intuitions. Regrettably the same does not hold for his symmetry 
objection against expressivism: In chapter VI, Streumer mentions at numerous points that “it is 
hard not to feel that something … is missing” in the expressivist explanation, without specify-
ing what this ‘something’ amounts to. Since I, for one, do not share this feeling, the debate is 
once more hitting a brick wall of intuitions which chapters I-V admirably avoid.  
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Fig. 1: The collapse and inconsistency dilemmas 
Hence, if Streumer is right in claiming that relaxed realism’s downfall is caused by the 
same reasons as metaphysical normative realism’s, relaxed realists must also be impaled 
on the horns of the inconsistency dilemma. But are they?    
3 Why Relaxing Defuses the Inconsistency Dilemma  
There are at least two ways for relaxed realists to defuse Streumer’s inconsistency di-
lemma. The first uses minimalism about properties to reject (N) as the correct criterion 
of property identity and thus pulls the rug from under Streumer’s Reduction Argument. 
Since this riposte could not be more straightforward, let us call it the ‘direct response’. 
The second, more complex reply remains agnostic about the correct criterion of prop-
erty identity, yet seeks to show that even if relaxed realists accepted the identity of nor-
mative and non-normative properties, their position would remain immune to the 
problems Streumer identifies. Given as much, let us call this the ‘immunity response’. I 
look at these in turn. 
3.1 The direct response to the Reduction Argument 
The direct response pursues the most straightforward path to reject Streumer’s Reduc-
tion Argument by pointing out that relaxed realists do not share its premises (see Fig. 
2).  
To elaborate, we have already stated that relaxed realists are minimalists: They en-
dorse a minimalist rather than a robust conception of properties. As Streumer himself 
explains, though, which criterion of property identity is appropriate depends on what 
we take properties to be (pp.11-12). If properties are understood robustly in the sense 
of ‘ways an object can be’, (N) is the right criterion—or so he takes great pains to argue. 
However, if properties are understood in a minimalist way as the shadows of concepts, 
Streumer suggests that (N) must be replaced with a criterion along the lines of (2) 
(p.12): 
(2)  Two predicates ascribe the same property if and only if they express the same 
concept. 
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Fig. 2: The direct response to the Reduction Argument 
Given that relaxed realists are minimalists about properties, then, they are not commit-
ted to (N), but to (2), say. (2), though, does not tie property identity to necessary co-
extensiveness, but to the expression of concepts. Consequently, since normative predi-
cates and descriptive predicates express different concepts, relaxed realists can accept 
the necessary co-extensiveness of normative and descriptive properties without thereby 
having to admit that these properties are also identical.  
So, even if Streumer were right in arguing that metaphysical normative realists cannot 
be non-reductivists because their commitment to (P1) and (N) together with the neces-
sary co-extensiveness of normative and descriptive properties entails the reduction of 
the former to the latter, non-metaphysical, relaxed realists need not lose any sleep over 
Streumer’s Reduction Argument: If they want to defend the non-identity of normative 
and descriptive properties, nothing that Streumer has said so far stops them from doing 
so. 
Now, given that this direct response is not only extremely straightforward, but also 
foreshadowed in Streumer’s own text, you might think that there must be something 
wrong with it. For instance, it might be thought that the minimalist conception of 
properties on which the direct response relies is not plausible in the first place. Howev-
er, if this were Streumer’s position, it would be one that would have to be developed 
not only far more thoroughly, but also independently from the dilemmas he presents. Al-
ternatively, Streumer might believe that relaxed realists’ combination of minimalism 
about properties and representationalism is a non-starter, for instance when declaring 
that if “normative judgements represent the world, they ascribe normative properties in 
the sense of a way objects can be” (p.100). As Streumer will certainly agree, though, this 
cannot be right if we take minimalism seriously. After all, minimalism is supposed to 
apply tout court: That is, it is to include minimalism about truth, fact, reference, represen-
tation, belief, etc. in order to prevent the re-inflation of semantic notions through re-
cursive definitions (see Price 1997). As such, relaxed realists will combine their mini-
malism about representation with the claim that all properties—be they normative or 
non-normative—must be understood minimally. Hence, when relaxed realists accept 
(1) as the correct definition of their position, they will do so not because they would 
reject the existence of robust normative properties since they believe that only descriptive 
properties are robust, but because there are no robust properties—full stop. Note that 
this does not amount to tarring all properties with the same brush. For, just as minimal-
ism about truth does not entail that all truths are of the same kind, minimalism about 
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properties does not entail that all properties are of the same kind: Recent responses to 
the related problem of ‘creeping minimalism’ (Dreier 2004) have gone a long way to 
show how this diversity of discourses can be preserved despite their unity regarding the 
adoption of minimalism.4 
However, there might still be a more indirect argument that Streumer could field 
against the direct response. This does not target minimalism’s combination with repre-
sentationalism, but with non-reductionism. He explains: 
What should non-reductive realists take properties to be? Their disagreement with 
reductive realists is not about whether normative and descriptive predicates express 
different concepts. Both sides agree that they do. Instead, this disagreement is about 
whether sentences that contain normative predicates have the same truthmakers as 
sentences that contain only descriptive predicates. Reductive realists think they do, 
and non-reductive realists think they do not. Non-reductive realists therefore cannot 
take properties to be shadows of concepts. They must instead take them to be ways 
objects can be. (pp.12-13) 
In a nutshell, then, Streumer argues that for the debate between reductionism and non-
reductionism to be significant at all, it must concern properties in the sense of ways 
objects can be, not in the sense of being shadows of concepts. If successful, this would 
thus confront relaxed realists with yet another dilemma: Either, they choose to hold on 
to minimalism about properties, but have to admit that their non-reductionism is emp-
ty. Or they choose to defend a meaningful form of non-reductionism, but have to reject 
minimalism about properties. Given as much, let us call this the ‘meaningfulness di-
lemma’ (see Fig. 3).  
      
Fig. 3: The meaningfulness dilemma 
Now, Streumer’s quote can be read as suggesting that relaxed realists begrudgingly have 
to pick the second horn of this dilemma. However, I believe that they should quite 
happily grasp the first.   
To see why, remember that the debate between reductionists and non-
reductionists has traditionally acquired its explosiveness through the metaphysical wor-
ry of how to place normative properties within a naturalistic world. By reducing norma-
tive properties to non-normative properties, metaphysical reductionists have a straight-
forward response at hand; metaphysical non-reductionists, conversely, find themselves 
in deeper water when trying to explain how to understand normative properties and 
their relation to non-normative properties. Relaxed realists, though, do not share the 
metaphysical worry that underlies this debate. Rather, they think that the query ‘How 
                                                             
4 To quote but two examples of this attempt to preserve and explain the “diverse unity” of 
propositions, see Price (2013: 47) and Williams (2013). 
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can we place normative properties within a natural world?’ is the wrong question to ask 
in the first place. Instead, they repeatedly tell us that when thinking about the existence 
of normative facts and properties, we must not draw on general metaphysical princi-
ples—say with regard to causal efficacy, metaphysical reducibility, deliberative indispen-
sability or explanatory potency—, nor worry about how demands of the natural domain 
could be applied to the normative. Rather, to ask whether or not there are normative 
properties is to ask whether or not anything is good, bad, rational, justified, just or un-
just, say. The additional question ‘How do these properties fit into a natural world?’ has 
no place within this enquiry.  
Consequently, insofar as the traditional distinction between metaphysical non-
reductionism and reductionism is supposed to respond to this very question, relaxed 
realists should lose no sleep over Streumer’s observation that this dispute would be 
rendered meaningless if we understood properties minimally. After all, if the question 
itself is no longer relevant, then neither is the preservation of different responses to it. 
Does this mean that relaxed realism’s non-reductionism becomes nothing more 
than an empty phrase, as the first horn of the meaningfulness dilemma suggests? Not 
necessarily. For, even though Streumer is right in pointing out that nobody disputes the 
claim that normative and non-normative predicates express different concepts, it is still 
an important insight that normative discourse cannot be reduced to any non-normative 
domain. Rather, it has its own discourse-specific rules governing how to find out about 
normative truths, what normative justification requires, what its link to action and ra-
tionality involves, in which way normative properties supervene on descriptive ones 
and so on. It is this kind of irreducibility that relaxed realists are keen to defend when 
talking about the irreducibility of the normative, and not some dispute about metaphys-
ical reducibility which they themselves brand as misguided. The meaningfulness dilem-
ma, therefore, does not threaten relaxed realism. 
To sum up, then, no possible retort to the direct response that we could extract 
from Streumer’s text is convincing. Rather, these replies beg the question against mini-
malism, or would need to be developed in far greater detail, or rely on a misunderstand-
ing of what kind of irreducibility relaxed realists aim to defend. As such, the direct re-
sponse stands: Relaxed realists can simply pull the plug on the Reduction Argument by 
rejecting its premises. As a first interim result, then, we can record that even if meta-
physical realists found themselves impaled on the horns of Streumer’s inconsistency 
dilemma, relaxed realists can remain non-reductionists without running into any incon-
sistencies. 
3.2 The Immunity Response to the Anti-Reduction Argument 
Assume, though, that relaxed realists were not to pursue the direct response. How 
would they fare if they accepted the identity of normative and non-normative proper-
ties? Would this entail the re-inflation of relaxed realism? Would it imply its incon-
sistency by impaling relaxed realists on the horn of the Anti-Reduction Argument? The 
‘immunity response’ aims to answer both questions negatively. 
Before developing this response, though, let me first clear a different question out 
of the way, namely: Are relaxed realists committed to taking a stance on property iden-
tity at all? Streumer appears to think so: If relaxed realists “say that [normative] judge-
ments represent the world”, he explains, “they must tell us whether the properties that 
these judgements ascribe are identical to descriptive properties” (p.101). Now, if this 
were what Streumer’s challenge to relaxed realists really encompassed, note that it 
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would be much weaker than the previous claim that anyone accepting normative repre-
sentation must also accept the identity of normative and descriptive properties. After 
all, it requests only that something about their identity or non-identity must be said, not 
what must be said.  
Yet, why should relaxed realists accept even this weaker challenge? As I have ex-
plained above, according to them nothing hangs on this question, as it neither affects 
normative properties’ existence nor our ability to find out about them. Queerness, re-
member, is no longer their worry. Instead, of central concern are normative questions 
such as ‘Are only actions that maximise utility right?’, ‘Does justice consist in the equal 
distribution of resources?’ or ‘Do only desires give me reason to perform an action?’. If 
we can answer normative questions such as these as participants of normative dis-
course, we have all the relevant responses we require. It is thus by no means clear why 
relaxed realists should feel the need to say anything about metaphysically interpreted 
identity-relations between utility maximisation and rightness, say, or justice and equality 
of resources. 
But assume that we were not quite as ‘maximally relaxed’ as this response presup-
poses. Instead, imagine that relaxed realists took up the following position: Firstly, they 
steadfastly hold on to their non-reductionism about normative discourse and concepts, 
maintaining that these concepts and discourse-specific rules cannot be reduced to or 
overridden by non-normative concepts and discourse-specific rules. Secondly, follow-
ing roughly the thoughts that Streumer develops in §12, they explain that there is a 
normative constraint on normative theories, such that these theories can be true only if 
they identify descriptive properties with which normative properties are necessarily 
coextensive. That is, normative theories must be of the form: ‘Necessarily, an action 
that maximises utility is right’, ‘Necessarily, an initial distribution of resources that is 
equal is just’, etc. Put differently, then, if normative views are correct, non-normative 
and descriptive properties are necessarily coextensive (p.31). Since relaxed realists do, of 
course, hold that some such normative theory is indeed correct, they are thus commit-
ted to defending the necessary co-extensiveness of these properties as a matter of norma-
tive fact. What does this imply for their identity? Assume that, as hinted in the ‘maximally 
relaxed’ response, relaxed realists are not particularly interested in this question and 
thus do not have a preconceived stance on it. However, let us imagine, thirdly, that 
since this question is of no importance to them, they simply follow Streumer in accept-
ing (N) as the correct criterion of property identity. As a result, their endorsement of 
the (normatively grounded) necessary co-extensiveness of normative and descriptive 
properties also commits them to their identity—just as is claimed by the Reduction 
Argument. Given this background, then, relaxed realists remain to be non-reductionists 
about normative discourse and concepts, yet become reductionists about normative 
properties. What follows for relaxed realism? 
Most intuitively, we might think that this spells the end for the relaxed position: 
After all, if relaxed realists agreed that normative and descriptive properties are identi-
cal, they would simply become metaphysical realists! Whether or not this is true, 
though, obviously depends on what we understand by ‘relaxed’ and ‘metaphysical’. On 
one reading, we could suggest that to be a relaxed realist is to believe (roughly) that 
normative properties are not located within the natural world. If so, accepting the iden-
tity of normative and natural properties would indeed lead to the death of relaxed real-
ism. However, this is not the understanding that we should accept—indeed, nothing 
said so far has in any way relied on such a metaphysical definition of relaxed realism. 
Rather, what I have emphasised throughout is that to be a relaxed realist is to believe 
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that no general metaphysical criteria are relevant for the existence of and enquiry into 
normative truths and properties. Consequently, it is this methodological definition, ra-
ther than some metaphysical thesis, that demarcates relaxed from metaphysical realism. 
On this methodological definition, though, accepting the identity of normative and 
descriptive properties does not undermine relaxed realism. For, it is not whether or not 
these properties are identical which is important, but whether or not the former can be 
said to exist only if they were deliberatively indispensable, featured in explanations, 
were causally efficacious or reducible to descriptive properties, say. Relaxed realists’ 
response to this question remains a clear ‘No’, no matter what their stance on property-
identity might be.  
Yet, even if this first worry can be assuaged by adopting the methodological inter-
pretation of relaxed realism, a second follows hot on its heels. For, if relaxed realists 
now agree that normative and descriptive properties are identical, they obviously face 
Streumer’s Anti-Reduction Argument just as much as metaphysical reductionists do!5 
As such, they now owe us a reductionism-friendly account of how it comes about that 
normative predicates refer to descriptive properties. As indicated by the Anti-Reduction 
Argument, though, Streumer thinks that no such account is forthcoming. As a result, 
relaxed realists end up just as impaled on the horns of the inconsistency dilemma as 
their metaphysical counterparts: They too are committed to holding normative and 
descriptive properties as both identical and non-identical. 
There are two ways in which relaxed realists can react to the Anti-Reduction Ar-
gument. The first once more takes up a maximally relaxed stance and bluntly denies 
that relaxed realists need to explain the meaning and reference of normative concepts: 
Once we relax, they could submit, questions of semantics and metasemantics no longer 
require any explaining. I find this stance utterly unconvincing. After all, relaxing about 
normative truths renders a question such as ‘How come that ‘right’, rather than ‘blue’, 
means what it does?’ neither trivial nor irrelevant—there clearly must be something said 
in response to this question. Consequently, relaxed realist cannot withdraw to the im-
plausible position of treating matters of meaning as matters of brute fact. Instead, they 
should accept Streumer’s metasemantic challenge, but seek to show that his Anti-
Reduction Argument fails. Let us develop this second reaction to the Anti-Reduction 
Argument in greater detail.    
To do so would obviously require a properly worked-out metasemantics for re-
laxed realism—which, objectionably, relaxed realists do not have. I will return to this 
problem shortly. However, given its defining feature of discourse-internality and se-
mantic non-reductionism, it does not seem far-fetched to assume that whatever relaxed 
realism’s metasemantic view comes to, it will not amount to a descriptivist view which 
seeks to determine the reference of normative predicates by appeal to fully descriptively 
specified conditions.6 Instead, it will fall either into the second or the third category of 
responses to the Anti-Reduction Argument that Streumer considers: 
                                                             
5 A related worry might be that if relaxed realists accepted the identity of normative and nat-
ural properties, say, they would also inherit all the other problems which generally inflict meta-
physical reductionists. Since this would lead us too far afield, I will bracket this concern here. 
6 According to Streumer, descriptivist accounts face the so-called ‘false guarantee objection’ 
(§20). Note that the success of this objection is far from guaranteed. Besides it being unclear in 
which way this objection differs from twin earth arguments or the thesis that normative terms 
are semantically irreducible, once we take into account the meaning-truth platitude ‘If word w 
means F, then (x) (w is true of x iff Fx)’, it is hard to see how the ‘guarantee’ that w is true of 
everything that is F should be false, provided that w really means F. 
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(P2) What makes it the case that a certain normative predicate ascribes a certain 
descriptive property is that, in certain normatively specified conditions, users of 
this predicate would apply it to objects that have this property. (p.43) 
(P3) What makes it the case that a certain normative predicate ascribes a certain 
descriptive property is that the correct first-order normative view applies this 
predicate to objects that have this property. (p.44) 
What, according to Streumer, is wrong with (P2)? Well, since (P2) refers to normatively 
specified conditions, it uses further normative predicates—such as ‘rational’, ‘justifia-
ble’, or ‘in line with the moral point of view’—in order to fix the reference of norma-
tive terms. This, in turn, raises the question of these further normative terms’ reference, 
which must again be determined on grounds of the normatively specified conditions 
mentioned in (P2), which again raises questions about the reference of these terms, … 
and so on ad infinitum. 
Interestingly, Streumer believes that non-reductivists do not face this infinite re-
gress, which makes them free to endorse (P2) (p.52). However, I cannot see why reduc-
tivists should fare any worse. To elaborate, remember that the version of reductionism 
that the Anti-Reduction Argument seeks to undermine is of a metaphysical kind, i.e. one 
that concerns the identity of normative and descriptive properties. This, though, must be 
kept strictly separate from a semantic reductionism, which seeks to reduce the meaning 
of normative concepts to that of fully descriptive terms. Since (P2), denying that a de-
scriptive specification of normative vocabulary can be given, is an instance of semantic 
non-reductionism, (P2) would indeed be out of the question if relaxed realists (and other 
metaphysical reductivists) were also semantic reductivists. However, as stated above, 
relaxed realists defend semantic non-reductionism. Consequently, since semantic non-
reductionism does not entail metaphysical non-reductionism, it is by no means incon-
sistent to maintain both that normative and descriptive properties are identical and that 
we cannot help but employ normative terms so as to specify the meaning and reference 
of normative concepts. Consequently, even if relaxed realists let themselves be roped into 
an identity-claim about normative and descriptive properties, I cannot see why this 
should ban them from defending (P2). 
What, according to Streumer, is wrong with (P3)? Besides indicating that (P3) 
might collapse into (P2), the main worry that Streumer appears to harbour about (P3) is 
what we can call the circularity objection. For, briefly after introducing (P3), he asks: 
But what makes a first-order normative view correct? Non-reductive realists would 
say that  
(1)  What makes a first-order normative view correct is that the objects to which 
this view ascribes normative properties really have these properties.  
But reductive realists cannot say this: if reductive realism is true, what makes it the 
case that an object really has a normative property is that one of its descriptive prop-
erties can be ascribed with a normative predicate. This means that if reductive real-
ists endorsed (1), this would return them to the question we started with: what 
makes it the case that a certain normative predicate ascribes a certain descriptive 
property? (p.59) 
I find this quote puzzling. For, should not anybody be able to endorse (1)? After all, it 
appears totally deflationary. Compare: ‘What makes it the case that hedonism, claiming 
that only pleasure is good, is the correct moral view? Well, what makes this theory cor-
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rect is that pleasure, and only pleasure, really is good!’ Since (1) seems to be little more 
than a variation of the T-schema, any metaethicist should easily be able to endorse it. 
Alternatively, Streumer could intend this quote to be read as implying that in order 
to speak of truth at all, we need to speak of robust truth-makers. However, since this 
reading simply begs the question against relaxed realism and its adoption of minimal-
ism, this cannot be the right interpretation either. As I have argued above, if Streumer 
really wanted to oppose minimalism, we do not find the reasons for this rejection in his 
book—rather further arguments that are independent from his dilemmas would need to 
be presented to back up this rebuttal.  
Finally, Streumer’s quote might implicitly presuppose not a robust conception of 
truth as such, but rather a certain order of explanation which envisages that in order to 
decide which normative theory is true, we need to fix the reference of moral terms first. 
That is, first we need to determine to which descriptive property ‘good’ refers. Once we 
have found out that ‘good’ refers to being pleasurable, say, we can then define truth 
recursively by declaring that if X is pleasurable, ‘X is good’ is true. But if so, Streumer 
could conclude, the truth of a normative theory such as hedonism cannot stand at the 
beginning of our metasemantic enquiry, but can only ever form its conclusion.  
However, why should relaxed realists accept this ‘building-block theory’, as Da-
vidson (1980: 135) called it, which tries to analyse the basic reference of singular names 
and simple predicates first and then takes this to form the foundation for its characteri-
sation of complex terms’ reference and, finally, truth? Why should they not follow Da-
vidson (1980, 1984) and others (McDowell 1977, 1980; Brandom 1994) by proceeding 
in exactly the opposite direction, namely by explaining that first, we must fix meaning 
holistically—which must include appeal to normative theories!— and then we abstract 
reference assignments so as to make sentences come out as true? After all, it is this di-
rection of explanation which dovetails best with the general thrust of the relaxed posi-
tion. For, relaxed realists would never want to say that a moral theory about goodness, 
say, is true because the descriptive property that it identifies as the ground of goodness 
can be ascribed with the predicate ‘good’. Since this presupposes that reference can be 
determined without consulting normative theories and normative discourse, nothing 
could be further from the relaxed mindset and its focus on discourse-internality. In 
contrast, the holistic approach, according to which reference has “no life of its own, 
independent of the truth of sentences” (Williams 1999: 559) fully honours the relaxed 
focus on normative theories and discourse. Consequently, contrary to what Streumer 
appears to suggest in his text, relaxed realists will insist that we cannot help but start 
with the truth of sentences in which normative predicates feature and only then deter-
mine the reference of normative predicates. As long as Streumer has not shown that 
this holistic approach to meaning and reference must be rejected, then, there is no rea-
son why relaxed realists should not endorse (P3). 
Let us sum up. I have stated that even if relaxed realists accepted the identity of 
normative and descriptive properties—an issue which, I have argued, bears no signifi-
cance for their account—their position remains immune to Streumer’s arguments: 
Since relaxed realists are keen to defend the irreducibility of normative concepts and 
discourse, and not some metaphysical (ir)reducibility thesis, accepting the identity of 
normative and descriptive properties does not undermine the relaxed stance. Since, in 
turn, this non-reductionism about normative concepts can be combined with a reduc-
tionism about properties, there is no reason why they should not explain the reference 
of normative concepts in terms of (P2). And since they are most likely to adopt a holis-
tic approach to meaning and reference, the circularity objection that Streumer seems to 
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raise against (P3) also appears misplaced unless further arguments are presented. If so, 
the Anti-Reduction Argument need not worry relaxed realists. 
4 A new collapse dilemma? 
Where do we stand? I have argued that by adopting the direct response, relaxed realists 
can straightforwardly counter Streumer’s Reduction Argument and defend the non-
identity of normative and non-normative properties. By pursuing the immunity re-
sponse, in turn, they can show that even if they accepted reductionism about normative 
properties, Streumer’s Anti-Reduction Argument does no harm to them. Either way, 
then, Streumer’s inconsistency dilemma is defused: Even if it left metaphysical realists 
in trouble, relaxed realists can defend the existence of normative truths and properties 
without becoming entangled in inconsistency.  
Why, then, is Streumer so sceptical about relaxed realism? My hunch is that the 
reason is two-fold. Firstly, it remains undoubtedly the case that relaxed realism is not 
(as yet) a fully worked-out position: Many of its details remain objectionably unclear. 
These comprise issues such as the relaxed understanding of domains, discourse-specific 
norms ‘settling’ normative truths, concerns of ontological promiscuity etc. Importantly, 
this lack of clarity also pertains to the key question of which metasemantic view relaxed 
realists wish to defend.  
Secondly, Streumer might think that it is with regard to this metasemantic question 
that his collapse dilemma resurfaces, albeit in different form. For, once we press relaxed 
realists on their metasemantic view, some argue that it becomes clear that their position 
either collapses into a form of expressivism or metaphysical realism. That is, if they try 
to provide an account which is recognisably realist, their position will amount to meta-
physical normative realism. If, in turn, they seek to provide an account which is non-
metaphysical, it will collapse into expressivism. Since either way, relaxed realism would 
fail to amount to a distinctive, independent metaethical position, it could not function 
as a metaethical competitor to the error theory and thus need not be taken seriously by 
Streumer. Let us call this the ‘new collapse dilemma’ (Fig. 4). 
                             
 
Fig. 4: The new collapse dilemma 
Now, whilst this new challenge to relaxed realism is indeed dangerous, let me empha-
sise two points. Firstly, we should note that in regard to this new collapse dilemma, the 
jury is still out: So far, no relaxed realist has made a serious attempt to spell out a 
metasemantic view that would be both realist and relaxed. No doubt, doing so will be 
no easy feat, and this paper is certainly not the place to embark on such a project. 
However, we should also note, secondly, that the new collapse dilemma has nothing to 
do with the error-theoretic arguments developed by Streumer. Hence, if this new argu-
ment were indeed the main reason for Streumer’s resistance to relaxing about norma-
tive truths, we do not find it in his book. Accordingly, far more would need to be said 
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to shore up relaxed realism’s alleged collapse. As has been explained here, mere appeal 
to the adoption of minimalism about representation will not do the trick.   
5 Conclusion 
Streumer believes that there is “no way around” the result that non-error-theoretic 
views fail either for the same reasons as metaphysical normative realism or expressivism 
(p.101). I have shown here that there is a way around this: We can relax about norma-
tive truths. At the same time, I have admitted that being the ‘new kid on the block’ that 
it is, relaxed realism still leaves many questions unanswered. Now, Streumer’s dilemmas 
certainly and quite rightly press us to clarify what exactly this relaxed position involves. 
However, insofar as there are reasons to reject the relaxed approach, we do not discov-
er them in Streumer’s book. Until we find these reasons elsewhere, my suggestion thus 
is: Let’s relax. 
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